This essay was written in the Northern Summer where things in the UK were much worse than they seem at present. At least the new PM and his government are ‘playing’ with ‘governance system’ reform. And even Alastair and Rory are touching on the subject triggered by elections in Israel and New Zealand. It is be hoped that the initiatives being taken under Andy Burnham are pursued with commitment and intellectual rigour and that Alastair and Rory take the whole issues of governance system reform more seriously for much longer. Imagine breaking into the means to enact systemic governing? Anthony Albanese take notice.
After last week’s seismic elections across the UK — Labour haemorrhaging councils to Reform and the Greens, the SNP clinging to power in Holyrood, fragmentation accelerating across all four nations — Britain’s most celebrated political podcast rushed to a verdict. Episode 530 of The Rest Is Politics, titled “Is Starmer the Next Joe Biden?”, framed it all as a question about one man’s survival. Could Keir Starmer endure? Who might replace him? Was he, in Rory Stewart’s words, developing a pattern of blaming others?
The episode title is itself a diagnosis of the malaise it refuses to name.
This is not a criticism of Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart, who are thoughtful, experienced, and genuinely illuminating on the internal mechanics of Westminster. It is a criticism of the entire architecture of contemporary political commentary — in Britain, in Australia, and across the democratic world. We have built a vast, sophisticated industry of political analysis, and it is almost entirely focused on the wrong unit of analysis. We scrutinise leaders when we should be scrutinising systems.
A Bad System Will Beat a Good Person, Every Time
- Edwards Deming stated it plainly: a bad system will beat a good person, every time. This is not a counsel of despair about individuals. It is a recognition that the structures, institutions, and feedback dynamics within which individuals operate are far more powerful determinants of outcomes than individual character, charisma, or will.
Yet turn on the television, open a newspaper, load a podcast — and the story of governance is almost invariably told as a story about persons. Blair was visionary but triangulating. Brown capable but dour. Cameron breezy but shallow. May dutiful but wooden. Johnson charismatic but unscrupulous. Sunak competent but disconnected. Starmer principled but uninspiring. And so the carousel turns, while the system that shapes all of them goes unreformed.
The same pattern holds in Australia, where political commentary has consumed itself for two decades in a parallel drama of leadership instability. Rudd, Gillard, Rudd, Abbott, Turnbull, Morrison, Albanese — each transition narrated as a contest of personalities, each policy failure attributed to individual character flaws or strategic miscalculations. Paul Kelly’s account of the 2007–14 period concluded that ‘the process of debate, competition and elections leading to national progress has broken down’ and that this constituted ‘the inability of political decision-makers to address the problems of their nations.’ Even Kelly, a systemic thinker by disposition, cannot fully escape the gravitational pull of personality.
Structure-Determined Systems: The Cat That Eats Small Birds
Systems thinking offers a more precise diagnosis. The biologist Humberto Maturana introduced the concept of structure-determined systems — systems that operate according to how they are constituted, not according to the intentions of those within them. When we take a car to a mechanic, we treat it as a structure-determined system: it operates through the interactions of its components, and no amount of willing it to perform differently will change its structural properties.
Governance systems are structure-determined in exactly this sense. The three or four-year electoral cycle creates systematic incentives for short-termism, regardless of who is Prime Minister. The adversarial architecture of Westminster rewards point-scoring over problem-solving, regardless of whether the occupant of the despatch box is a villain or a saint. The hierarchical structure of government departments embeds command-and-control approaches to inherently complex situations, regardless of how many ministers declare their commitment to collaboration.
When the targets culture of New Labour’s ‘deliverology’ led, at Stafford Hospital, to a regime in which pursuing waiting-time metrics took priority over patient care — with hundreds of deaths the consequence — one analyst observed with brutal precision: accusing such organisations of neglecting patients to focus on targets is ‘like berating cats for eating small birds. That’s what they do.’ The cat’s behaviour is not a character failing; it is a structural property. So too with governance systems that consistently produce outcomes their participants neither intend nor desire.
This structural framing connects productively with insights from systemic family therapy. Gregory Bateson, and later the Milan school of therapists, distinguished between problem-determined systems — where a problem or issue brings a system into being around it — and system-determined problems — where the system itself (or those within it) generate the problems whilst conserving the system itself. The parallel with political analysis is direct. When the question is asked “what is wrong with UK governance?” and the answer is ‘Keir Starmer’ then the situation is being treated as a system determined problem – the answer is framed within the image of the system as it exists. But when we ask “what structural properties of the British governance system produce this pattern of failure, regardless of who leads?” we invite systemic inquiry leading to understanding, action and change, the essence of recognising and formulating a problem-determined system. The therapy is not to replace a ‘jump to solution’ within the parameters of the current system i.e., ‘change the leader’ but to transform the relational system within which they are embedded.
What the System Actually Is
Governance systems have specific, identifiable structural features that constrain what is possible within them, regardless of who is nominally in charge. These include the electoral cycle; the adversarial parliamentary model; the hierarchical structure of departments shaped by what Max Weber called the drive toward standardisation — the elimination of local knowledge and adaptive judgment in favour of uniform procedures; and the institutional inertia that Laura Tingle, in her analysis of Australian governance, traces to five structural causes: the rise of an unstable executive at the expense of parliament; the decline of the public service and its institutional memory; the dominance of national security establishments; a media transformed into a channel for present-tense information; and the increasing erosion of civil rights.
Stein Ringen, examining New Labour’s record from 1997 to 2007, reached a verdict that should have been heard as a thunderclap but passed largely unremarked. He found that one of the most capable and electorally dominant governments in British history had achieved ‘absolutely nothing’ in its flagship policies of child poverty, education, social justice and health. Not slightly less than promised. Nothing. His conclusion was devastating: no UK government, of any political persuasion, could get done what it is elected to do. The system of governance itself was the obstacle.
Ed Straw — a former PwC partner who spent decades inside government as adviser and auditor to multiple UK departments — arrived at the same conclusion through different means. In Stand and Deliver: A Design for Successful Government (2014), he argues that government doesn’t have to be this bad, but that nothing will improve until we understand that the present system as a whole is itself what stands in the way of successful government. Treating governments as organisations — bigger and more complex than most, but organisations nonetheless — Straw proposed a ‘Treaty for Government’: a foundational redesign of the agreement between a society and those whose job it is to improve it, built on genuine feedback mechanisms, limited terms of office, specialist civil servants replacing generalist cultures, and what he terms ‘resulture’ — systematic, independent monitoring of whether government is actually achieving what it sets out to achieve. These are not tinkering reforms. They are structural reconfigurations of how the system is constituted.
When the Judiciary Becomes Part of the Problem
The systemic failure of governance is not confined to the executive. The Masterplan podcast — the most important piece of investigative political journalism to emerge from the United States in recent years, winner of the 2025 National Press Club Award for audio journalism — documents with meticulous archival evidence how a deliberate, fifty-year structural campaign transformed the US Supreme Court from an institution of constitutional constraint into an instrument of oligarchic power.
The story begins with Lewis Powell, a corporate lawyer who in 1971 wrote a confidential memo to the US Chamber of Commerce warning that American free enterprise was under threat from consumer advocates and environmental reformers. The memo called for corporations to systematically invest in the judiciary, academia, think-tanks, and media to shift the ideological architecture of American politics. Months after writing it, Powell was appointed to the Supreme Court. His memo went viral among the business elite. The Federalist Society, the Heritage Foundation, and a network of billionaire-funded legal advocacy organisations grew from its seeds. The result, documented in extraordinary detail by David Sirota and The Lever’s investigative team, was the Citizens United decision of 2010 — which ruled that money in politics is constitutionally protected speech, and that corporations enjoy First Amendment rights — and a suite of subsequent rulings that systematically dismantled the architecture of campaign finance regulation.
The lesson for Australia and the UK is not that our systems face identical threats, though the influence of dark money and the capture of regulatory agencies by private interests is not uniquely American. The lesson is structural: that the judiciary, like the executive and the legislature, is embedded in a governance system, and that governance systems can be deliberately engineered over time by those with the patience, resources, and structural awareness that the political commentariat lacks. Powell and his successors were thinking in systems. Their critics, then and now, are mostly thinking in personalities.
We Know Reform Is Possible
The counsel of pessimism — that governance systems are too entrenched to change — is not supported by evidence (although one could wish for more experiments to generate the evidence). Structural reforms of considerable magnitude have been accomplished in living memory, when the political conditions combined with genuine systemic awareness.
New Zealand’s shift from first-past-the-post to mixed-member proportional representation in 1996 is the most instructive example. The reform was triggered not by charismatic leadership but by the system’s own demonstrable failure: a series of elections in which the distribution of votes bore so little relation to the distribution of seats that public trust collapsed. A Royal Commission on the Electoral System, established in 1986, recommended Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation. A referendum in 1993 confirmed it. Since 1996, no single party has won a majority of seats in eight consecutive elections — coalition and consensus governance has become the norm. New Zealand’s politics moved, structurally, from a confrontational model to a more consensual one. That shift was systemic, not personal.
The APSC’s 2007 report on wicked problems represented a moment of similar systemic clarity in Australia — a recognition that persistent policy failures in indigenous disadvantage, health, water reform, and climate were not the products of bad ministers but of structural incapacity to govern complexity. The tragedy was that this institutional clarity was abandoned within a year, not because it was wrong, but because it had been coined under the previous government. The incoming Rudd administration dropped the language of wicked problems from its lexicon. Upon such political tribalism rests the future of our world.
What Systemic Commentary Would Ask
The fragmentation of British politics in May 2026 — Reform at 26-27%, Greens surging, Labour collapsing, Conservatives quietly recovering — was widely reported as a story about Starmer’s personal failures. The deeper questions went largely unasked.
Why does first-past-the-post, combined with a short electoral cycle, widespread preferential lobbying (state capture) and a command-and-control executive culture, systematically fail to translate fragmented citizen preferences into effective policy? Why does the adversarial structure of Westminster make it structurally impossible to build the durable cross-party coalitions that genuinely wicked problems — climate change, housing, social care, water security — require? Why do both UK and Australian governance systems systematically shed the institutional memory that Tingle identifies as essential to effective policy?
These are not questions about Starmer, or Swinney, or Albanese. They are questions about the structural properties of systems that will continue to produce the same outputs regardless of who is nominally steering them. As Maturana would observe: the system does what it does because of how it is structured. You cannot change the outputs without changing the structure.
Ed Straw is right that incremental changes are insufficient. The present system stands in the way of successful government, and the way around it requires something closer to a foundational redesign — a treaty, a commission, a constitutional moment — of the kind that New Zealand achieved in 1993 and that most Anglophone democracies have consistently refused to contemplate.
The Rest Is Politics is an excellent podcast. But until political commentary begins seriously to ask structural questions rather than personality questions — until “what kind of system do we need?” displaces “who should lead it?” — we will continue to cycle through leaders, blaming each in turn for failures that were structural long before they arrived.
The cat will keep eating small birds. That’s what cats do. The question is whether we are willing to examine what kind of cat we have built — and whether we have the systemic imagination to build something else.
Ray Ison is Emeritus Professor at The Open University (UK), Visiting Professor in the Transdisciplinary School at UTS and Senior Fellow in the University of Vienna’s new Centre for Advanced Studies. He is co-author of ‘Governing in the Anthropocene: are there cyber-systemic antidotes to the malaise of modern governance?’ (Sustainability Science, 2018) and author of ‘Systems Practice: How to Act in Situations of Uncertainty and Complexity in a Climate-Change World’ (Springer, 2017). The French translation of his book with Ed Straw has recently been published in France.
Note on sources: Stein Ringen’s findings on New Labour are from The Economic Consequences of Mr Brown (2009). Laura Tingle’s analysis is from Political Amnesia: How We Forgot How to Govern (Quarterly Essay, 2015). Ed Straw’s proposals are from Stand and Deliver: A Design for Successful Government (Treaty for Government, 2014). David Sirota’s investigative work is from the Masterplan podcast (The Lever, 2023–24), winner of the 2025 National Press Club Award for audio journalism. The systemic family therapy distinction between problem-determined systems and system-determined problems draws on the work of Bateson and the Milan school. The New Zealand electoral reform account draws on the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (1986) and the 1993 referendum.
